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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONTROL
OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
BY POLITICAL REFUGEES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORA*
INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented exodus of political refugees from countries
dominated by tyrannical regimes has posed the interesting and vital
problem of controlling their activities in countries of asylum. While
the right of a State to grant asylum to those fleeing from persecution
and oppression is unquestioned,' the further question is immediately
presented as to how to prevent these persons from engaging in activi-
ties designed to undermine the political institutions of their native
land. This is clearly a matter which not only involves the good
relations between the State of refuge and that of which the refugees
are nationals, but which also seriously endangers the peace and
security of mankind. It is therefore a problem that must be treated in
the context of such values as peace and security that every govern-
ment is bound to promote and cultivate within its jurisdiction. Bear-
ing this in mind, this article will explore the principles of international
law that regulate the subject and the manner in which they are
applied by the United States.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Concurrent with the right of a State to grant asylum to political
refugees, international law recognizes the correlative duty to prevent
these persons from committing acts destructive of the political
* Professor of Law, University of Detroit.
1. The right to give asylum is not the question here. This right of the State is
generally recognized. See, for elaboration, Garcia-Mora, International Law and
Asylum as a Human Right (1956).
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and social order of the State from which they have escaped.2 This
duty is clear enough both on principle and policy, and has been said
to be nothing more than a phase of the general duty of a State to
prevent within its jurisdiction the commission of injurious acts
against friendly foreign governments.3 But looking comprehensively
at the issue, and insofar as it concerns political refugees in places of
asylum, the formulation of the duty in this manner is clearly an
attempted simplification of a principle which must be explained on
deeper grounds. Thus, behind the apparently simple duty of a State
to prevent refugees from plotting against the institutions of other
nations, lie far-reaching legal and political considerations. It is
believed that these are precisely the considerations which are sub-
verting the very foundations of the traditional law. Two considera-
tions can unmistakably be discerned in this connection.
First, it is common learning among international lawyers that the
right of jurisdiction which governments exercise within their terri-
tory carries with it the obligation to protect the rights of other
nations. This is a prescription resulting from the exercise of sov-
ereignty and unquestionably falling within the competence of the
territorial State.4 Judge Max Huber, the sole arbitrator in the cele-
brated Island of Palmas Case between the United States and the
Netherlands, summarized this obligation in the following terms:
Territorial sovereignty.., involves the exclusive right to display
the activities of the State. This right has as a corollary a duty:
the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other
States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in
peace and in war, together with the right which each State may
claim for its nationals in foreign territory.5
The above passage, though written over thirty years ago, has
acquired a special significance for the contemporary world, for it not
only requires the prevention of injurious acts against foreign States,"
but, perhaps more important, the protection of the rights of other
nations as well. A careful study of this latter obligation may conceiv-
ably reveal serious difficulties on the practical level, for since the
2. 2 Podest. Costa, Derecho Internacional Pfiblico 245-48 (3d ed. 1955).
3. Apparently Professor Quincy Wright puts all the emphasis upon this
principle. See Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 521, 528 (1960).
4. 1 Fauchille, Traitd du Droit International Public 3-10 (8th ed. 1925).
5. Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands). For text see 2 U.N.
Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
6. Judge John Bassett Moore, in his dissenting opinion in the Lotus Case said:
"It is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent the com-
mission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its people."
Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, at 88 (1927).
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rights of other governments must be protected within the internal
jurisdiction of all States, it can convincingly be argued that the world
community is likely to become a system of mutual assistance, thus
helping to perpetuate tyrannical regimes.7 It is largely for this
reason that Judge Hersch Lauterpacht argued in 1928 that a State
does not have the obligation to protect the constitution of a foreign
government whose ideology is distasteful to its own citizens." Indeed,
the deep ideological differences between governments would seem to
give ample support to this position. In principle, therefore, there
would seem to be nothing wrong with allowing the residents of a
State to help other peoples to rid themselves of a totalitarian regime.9
This argument, however, is highly deceptive, for it ignores the well-
established principle that in the presence of a civil strife or other
internal disturbances in another country, States must abstain from
participating in the conflict either directly by actual governmental
interference or indirectly by allowing citizens and aliens to help either
side to the conflict.'0 On this view, the toleration of revolutionary
activities by refugees would surely amount to an act of intervention in
violation of international law.,, The force of this suggestion reveals
itself with all its cogency when remembering that under traditional
law if a State does not suppress revolutionary activities taking place
within its jurisdiction, the customary right of self-defense on the
part of the menaced government is readily conceded.12
The second important consideration supporting the duty of the
State to prevent refugees from engaging in revolutionary activities
against their former government has been seen to be indissolubly
linked with the right of a State to grant asylum under international
law. It is generally accepted that asylum is a right which exclusively
belongs to the State, and the latter can exercise it in accordance with
the requirements of its laws.3 Appealing as this theory is to concep-
tions of absolute sovereignty, it nevertheless remains true that the
right to grant asylum is conferred upon States by international law,
7. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 184-87 (1948).
8. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign
States, 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 105, 117 (1928).
9. Cf. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Subversive Activities and
Hostile Propaganda by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 35 Ind. L.J. 306
(1960).
10. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 229 (1947).
11. Rugier, Les Guerres Civiles et le Droit des Gens 415, 417 (1903).
12. Cf. Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the
Americas 274 (1956).
13. In Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935 (1st Cir. 1948), the Court
of Appeals said: "... the right [of asylum] is that of the State voluntarily to
offer asylum, not that of the fugitive to insist upon it."
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and, that, though governments have a broad discretion in the
application and interpretation of the pertinent facts, it does not
follow that they are not bound by any consideration at all.
14 It
should carefully be noted that in granting or denying asylum States
are not performing a legally indifferent act of national policy, but
rather an international function of the greatest consequence for the
world community.15 If these observations be correct, it will naturally
follow that in the fulfillment of this function international law de-
mands that, consistently with the obligations of friendship and
solidarity between nations, political refugees should not be permitted
to plot against the institutions of their native country. 0 It should
thus be apparent that the right to grant asylum is given by interna-
tional law to be exercised under the implied condition that the State
of refuge does not become a base of subversive activities against
another nation. It should similarly be clear that the position of
political refugees is radically different from that of the nationals of
the State of refuge, for while in respect to the latter a State may
successfully escape international responsibility on purely internal
constitutional grounds,17 as regards political refugees, however, the
mere granting of asylum would implicitly give rise to the presumption
that the State has done so under the condition that such refugees be
adequately controlled in their political activities.' The non-fulfillment
of this duty is clearly an abuse of right for which the government
involved is internationally liable. 9 This right-duty dichotomy auto-
14. Judge John Bassett Moore said that in granting asylum a State acts "in
the light of its own interests, and of its obligations as a representative of social
order." 2 Moore, Digest of International Law 757 (1906).
15. Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 1949, at 327,
354-57 (n.d.).
16. Thus, on March 15, 1960, the United Nations Human Rights Commission
adopted a Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum, which says in Article 4
that "Persons enjoying asylum should not engage in activities contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations." For text, see U.N. Eco. Soc.
Council Off. Reec. 30th Sess., Supp. No. 8, at 17 (1960).
17. It will be seen (infra p. 203 ff.) that the United States has avoided interna-
tional responsibility by saying that the suppression of these activities might be
contrary to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
The files of the State Department are filled with such communications to foreign
governments. See, 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 141 (1941).
18. In this connection, Article 2 of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, signed at Geneva on July 28, 1951, says that "Every refugee has duties
to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he con-
form to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance
of public order." See U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refu-
gees and Stateless Persons, Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (A/Conf. 2/108) at 17 (1951).
19. As to the application of the abuse of right doctrine in international law,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss3/1
CONTROL OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
matically operates in the international legal order, for it is firmly
grounded on the recognition of a community of interests existing in
the world community imperatively demanding the suppression within
each country's territory of harmful activities directed against foreign
States.2 0 This condition is by far the most satisfactory one, for it
frankly recognizes that a right granted by international law cannot
be used to violate international law itself. 21
II. THE DOCTRINE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The foregoing observations are not really new, for they were well-
established in the doctrine of those who have been traditionally
regarded as the "fathers of international law." It may therefore be
beneficial to discuss their doctrines, if only to perceive the historical
consistency of the principle here treated.
While Grotius explicitly said that "a permanent residence ought
not to be denied to foreigners who, expelled from their homes, are
seeking refuge," he immediately added, as a condition of asylum,
"provided that they submit to the established government and observe
any regulations which are necessary to avoid strifes.122 It can of
course be suggested that in imposing this condition Grotius was
really thinking in terms of the public order and internal unity of the
State of refuge. However, a closer observation of his views patently
reveals that to Grotius dissensions were fatal ills of society to be
prevented at all costs and, thus, the maintenance of peace and order
was the most important value of the law.23 Coupling these views
with his frank denial of the right of revolution, 24 one must inevitably
see, Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community ch. 14
(1933). See also, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alejandro Alvarez in the Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950]
I.C.J. Rep. 4, 14.
20. U.N. Secretariat, Survey of International Law, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/1
Rev. 1, at 34-35 (1949).
21. It is for this reason that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, in
guaranteeing the right of asylum in Article 14 adds that "This right may not be
invoked in the case of prosecutions, genuinely arising from non-political crimes or
from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." For
the text of the Declaration, see 43 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 127 (1949).
22. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres bk. 2, ch. 2, § 26 (Kelsey's
transl. 1925).
23. Id. at bk. 1, ch. 4. See also Lauterpacht, International Law and Human
Rights 116 (1950).
24. He says in respect to the right of revolution:
But as civil society was instituted in order to maintain public tran-
quility, the State forthwith acquires over us and our possessions a greater
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conclude that Grotius regarded revolutionary activities by refugees
against their own State as equally reprehensible, simply because they
are likely to produce the type of internal disharmony which he vigor-
ously condemned. But Grotius' views on the subject cannot be ade-
quately understood unless it is remembered that to him natural law
imposed upon the States the double duty of granting asylum to the
persecuted and of acting as agents of the world community in the
preservation of peace and order.25 Thus viewed, the toleration of
revolutionary activities by refugees is highly inconsistent with the
latter obligation. One may safely say that the Grotian contribution
has not lost its validity for the contemporary world.
Like his illustrious predecessor, Vattel insisted on limiting the
right of asylum by conditions imposed by the State of refuge.20
Unlike Grotius, however, his limitations on asylum were motivated
by a firm desire to avoid complications with foreign governments.
In this connection he said:
But though this right [the right of asylum] is necessary and
perfect in the general view of it, we must not forget that it is but
imperfect with respect to each particular country. For, on the
other hand, every nation has a right to refuse admitting a for-
eigner into her territory, when he cannot enter without exposing
the nation to evident danger, or doing her a manifest injury.21
In line with the preceding passage, and in the part of his book
dealing with the duties of one nation towards the other, he emphat-
ically said that:
even in States which freely admit foreigners it is presumed that
the sovereign only grants them access on the implied condition
that they will subject to the laws-I mean to the general laws
established for the maintenance of good order and not operative
only in the case of citizens or subjects. 28
As Vattel believed that foreigners were subject to the laws of
good order on equal footing with citizens or subjects, the above
passage acquires a more useful meaning when viewed against the
background of his doctrine regarding the duty of a nation to prevent
right, to the extent necessary to accomplish this end. The State, there-
fore, in the interest of public peace and order, can limit that common
right of resistance .... If, in fact, the right of resistance should remain
without restraint, there will no longer be a State, but only a non-social
horde...." Grotius, op. cit. supra note 22, at bk. 1, ch. 4, § 2(1).
25. For a discussion of Grotius' views, see Basdevant, in Les Fondateurs du
Droit International 125-267 (1904).
26. Vattel, Le Droit des Gens bk. 2, ch. 4, § 56 (Fenwick's transl. 1916).
27. Id. at bk. 1, ch. 19, § 230.
28. Id. at bk. 2, ch. 8, § 101.
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its citizens from committing acts injurious to the peace of a foreign
nation. Since for present purposes this is particularly relevant, his
words must be quoted in extenso here. He said:
The Nation, or the sovereign, must not allow its citizens to
injure the subjects of another State, much less to offend that
State itself; and this not only because no sovereign should
permit those under his rule to violate the precepts of the natural
law, which forbids such acts, but also because Nations should
mutually respect one another and avoid any offense, injury or
wrong; in a word, anything which might be hurtful to others. If
a sovereign who has the power to see that his subjects act in ajust manner permits them to injure a foreign nation, either the
State itself or its citizens, he does no less a wrong to that nation
than if he injured it himself. Finally, the very safety of the State
and of society at large demands this care on the part of every
sovereign. 29
It can therefore be seen that Vattel considered the obligation to
prevent refugees from engaging in revolutionary activities against the
institutions of their country as proceeding from a mutual duty to
promote justice between nations. Underlying this obligation is the
necessity of co-existence of the States in the world community, for
only then can the fundamental rights of all States be adequately
assured. To permit refugees to injure their own State from foreign
territory, in the Vattelian conception, would clearly violate the
former's fundamental right of independence, thus seriously impairing
the harmonious relations that nations must maintain at all times.
This aspect of the Vattelian position has remained unchallenged, for
much of the present-day doctrine largely proceeds upon that view.
Such assertions of the "fathers of international law" raise impor-
tant points of substantive international law. For it seems fairly
clear that the peaceful coexistence of nations in the world community,
where the rights of sovereignty and equality of States are vital postu-
lates of the law, of necessity implies a mutual obligation to suppress
revolutionary acts directed against a friendly foreign nation.3o Today,
as when Grotius and Vattel wrote, the requirements of peaceful co-
existence constitute the raison d'etre of the duty of prevention im-
posed upon the asylum State.31 The crucial problem is, therefore,
whether a government values the interest of the world community
in peaceful co-existence sufficiently to impose upon itself the obliga-
29. Id. at bk. 2, ch. 6, § 72.
30. Kuhn, The Complaint of Yugoslavia Against Hungary with Reference to
the Assassination of King Alexander, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 87, 89 (1935).
31. Wright, supra note 3, at 531.
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tion to prevent and punish revolutionary activities which endanger
good relations between nations. 2
If the above observations be correct, it will at once be seen that the
problem of allowing political refugees to engage in revolutionary
activities is not exclusively confined to the relations between States.
It is similarly a matter in which the world community has interests
vitally at stake. One element which might have prevented an adequate
approach to this problem is that historically the possibilities that
refugees might have engaged in revolutionary activities did not really
arise until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Under
eighteenth century conditions political refugees, particularly those
accused of an offense against the State, were easily extradited under
existing treaties Z3 In fact, early extradition treaties were precisely
designed to make their extradition possible, so that the country from
which the refugees had fled could inflict punishment according to
its own laws.34 This eighteenth century experience proved to be
inadequate for twentieth century conditions, for refugees who unsuc-
cessfully rebelled against oppression have been guaranteed asylum
since the ninteenth century when the Belgian Parliament enacted a
celebrated law exempting political offenders from extradition.35 More-
over, refugees today have acquired an ever-increasing political impor-
tance, for States are likely to use them as a means of encouraging
subversion in their nation without the resort to open intervention.0
Since for this purpose refugees constitute effective and concealed
means of attack, they are invariably assured support by the govern-
32. Lord Jowitt, The Value of International Law in Establishing Co-operation
Among Nations, 1 Int'l L.Q. 295 (1947).
33. This point is well illustrated by the Treaty of July 18, 1829, signed between
France and Switzerland. Cited in Billot, Trait6 de l'Extradition 109 (1874).
For a history of early practice, see Clarke, A Treatise Upon the Law of Extradi-
tion ch. 2 (4th ed. 1903).
34. This practice was endorsed by Grotius, who speaking of political offenders,
said: "In the present and in recent generations, and in the majority of European
countries, this right, which we have discussed, of demanding for punishment those
who have fled beyond the frontier, has been exercised only with respect to crimes
that affect the public weal or that manifest extraordinary wickedness." Grotius,
op. cit. supra note 22, at bk. 2, ch. 21, § 5(5).
35. This law was enacted on October 1, 1833. See Beauchet, Trait6 de I'Extra-
dition 180-277 (1899).
36. In discussing the threat to the political independence and territorial integ-
rity of Greece before the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Greek
representative called attention to this in the following terms: "At present new
strategic conditions [have] widened the scope of the problem; aggression took less
and less the form of direct attack, but more and more that of disguised subversive
action." See U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 3d Sess., 1st Comm., 176th Meeting at 314
(1948).
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ment in whose jurisdiction asylum has been given.3 It is precisely at
this point that international law immediately becomes operative, for
what international law requires is that the government in question
refrain from tolerating groups intending to engage in revolutionary
plots against another State. There is ample evidence which gives
foundation to the assertion that the toleration of revolutionary activi-
ties by refugees is an act of aggression for which the asylum State
is internationally responsible.3 8
With these considerations in mind, it becomes quite apparent that
because of national policies, this branch of the law is likely to exhibit
a high degree of instability. It is interesting but not at all surprising
to note that the legal practice of the States in this area is governed
by a variety of rules dependent upon a disturbing number of actors.
These will be seen in the substantive treatment of the law of the
United States and the frustrated attempts of international law at
effective regulation.
III. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
The law of the United States regarding subversive acts of refugees
against their government is exclusively confined to obligations result-
ing from the laws of neutrality relating to an international or a civil
war. It has thus become well-established that political acts of refugees
against a foreign government are not punished unless they form part
of a military or naval expedition against a State with which the
United States is on friendly terms.3 9 In respect to the punishment of
hostile military expeditions, the statute in question says:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets
on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the
money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or
enterprise to be caried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district,
or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined
not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both.4 0
37. See the recent dispute between Tunis and the United Arab Republic regard-
ing a Tunisian refugee who engaged in revolutionary activities against Tunsia
from the Territory of the United Arab Republic. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1961, p. 9,
Col. 1.
38. Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law 850-58 (1956).
39. For a discussion of hostile military expeditions, see Garcia-Mora, Inter-
national Law and The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions, 27 Fordham L.Rev.
308 (1958).
40. Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1958). For the application of this
provision, see 7 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 17, at 397-404.
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In interpreting the above statute, the courts have uniformly held
that a military expedition is characterized by an association or
organization of a military character,41 having a common design of
hostile operation against a friendly State. 42 Since advocating and
engaging in revolutionary action against a foreign government lack
both of these conditions, they are likely to remain unpunished, for
unfortunately no legislation specifically covers such situations. Most
of these principles are instructively illustrated by communications of
the State Department answering complaints of foreign governments
for alleged revolutionary activities taking place within the United
States. Thus, on September 5, 1906, the federal government arrested
members of a Mexican revolutionary junta for attempting to initiate
a military expedition against Mexico from the United States. 3 The
evidence conclusively showed that a large body of armed men were
attempting to cross the frontier to overthrow the Government of
Mexico. 44  Subsequently, however, when the Mexican Government
brought to the attention of the State Department certain plots origina-
ting along the border of the American side, the United States
Government declined to act on the grounds that there was not yet any
evidence that the persons involved had violated the neutrality of the
United States by organizing a military expedition against Mexico.45
Similarly, when in 1885 the British Government inquired whether
participation in the Irish National League, an organization to promote
insurrection in Ireland, was an offense against the sedition statutes
of the United States, the State Department succinctly answered that
"treason and sedition made punishable under those statutes are trea-
son and sedition against the United States, and they do not make
punishable treason and sedition against foreign sovereigns.""10 It
may be pertinent to add that the State Department instructed the
British Government that the persons so acting might be amenable
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the states. 7 Also in a communica-
tion of July 31, 1885, addressed to the Spanish Minister, relating to
revolutionary activities of the supporters of the Cuban insurrection,
the State Department expressed similar views in an even more definite
form: "It [the United States] does not assume to visit with penalty
41. United States v. Tauscher, 233 Fed. 597, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
42. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 653-54 (1896).
43. See Note of the Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador Thompson, Sept.
11, 1906, 2 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 17, at 336-37.
44. Id. at 337-38.
45. Note of Ambassador Creel to Secretary of State Root, March 4, 1907.
Id at 339.
46. Note to Secretary of the State of Bayard to the British Minister, Mr.
Harris, April 2, 1885, 2 Moore, op. cit. supra note 14, at 431.
47. Id. at 432.
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conduct, which if committed within a foreign jurisdiction, might be
punished therein."48 Finally, President Grover Cleveland's fourth
message to Congress, in reference to the revolutionary activities of
Cubans in the United States, deplored that "the spirit of our institu-
tions and the tenor of our laws do not permit [revolutionary activi-
ties] to be made the subject of criminal prosecution. 4 9
The body of evidence thus gathered would seem to make it clear
that in American law a revolutionary activity becomes a punishable
offense only if it takes the form of a military or naval force.5 0 Con-
fronted with this technical legal position, and insofar as revolution-
ary activities stricto sensu might be involved, the interesting question
squarely arises as to how far the United States Government is bound
by the international law rules which impose upon States the duty to
prevent refugees from engaging in plots against their former govern-
ment. This question is the more pointed since a substantial part of
these rules has been embodied in many treaties, some of which have
been subscribed to by the United States. Particularly instructive in
this connection is the Pan-American Convention on the Duties and
Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife signed at Havana on
February 20, 1928,51 which binds the parties "to use all means at
their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their territory, nationals
or aliens, from participating in, gathering elements, crossing the
boundary or sailing from their territory for the purpose of starting or
promoting civil strife."' 52 In similar vein, the United Nations Charter 3
and the Charter of the Organization of American States54 contain
provisions of a general nature prohibiting the intervention of a State
in the internal affairs of another. There can be no doubt that these
provisions impose upon the United States a specific obligation to
prevent revolutionary activities by any person, which is clearly at
variance with the pronouncements of the State Department above
reviewed. Most recently, however, the State Department has acknowl-
edged the binding character of this obligation when clearly incorpo-
rated into a treaty to which the United States is a party.5 5 The exis-
48. Note of Secretary of State Bayard to Minister Valera, July 31, 1885, U.S.
Foreign Rel. 1885, at 776 (1886).
49. U.S. Foreign Rel. 1896, at xxxi (1897).
50. United States v. Tauscher, 233 Fed. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
51. For text, see Convention with Other American Republics, Feb. 20, 1928.
46 Stat. 2749, T.S. No. 814. Also The International Conferences of American
States 1889-1928, at 435 (Scott ed. 1931).
52. Convention with Other American Republics, supra note 51, art. 1, para. 1.
53. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3, 4.
54. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 15.
55. See the Statement of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge before the United
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tence of a treaty embodying such an obligation is therefore an over-
riding consideration, for it essentially assumes that the customary
freedom of action on the part of the United States has technically
come to an end. This drastic change in the American position can
roughly be attributed to two factors. The first is the firm conviction
that under international law the obligation to prevent revolutionary
activities against a foreign government does not exist apart from
treaty,16 and the second is simply that under American law there is no
federal common law of crimes, that federal crimes must be established
by statutes,57 and that, since treaties made under the authority of the
United States are the law of the land,8 the President could presum-
ably act under a treaty in much the same manner as he could under a
Congressional Act.59 This position apparently is not constitutionally
tenable under obligations stemming from general international law.°0
It may be added that in the absence of a treaty, the inability of the
United States to prevent revolutionary activities within its territory
is really traceable to its reluctance to extend the restrictions placed
upon its residents on the ground that to do so might involve unwar-
ranted limitations upon constitutional liberties.
The preceding observation brings into play another aspect of the
American practice, namely, that in attempting to prevent refugees
from engaging in revolutionary activities, more specially, in revolu-
tionary propaganda, difficulties of a constitutional nature may imme-
diately arise. Specifically, governmental action to prevent revolu-
tionary activities is likely to give rise to difficulties involving the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Thus,
when on November 28, 1910, the Mexican Government complained
that two revolutionaries had gone to Texas to stir up trouble against
Mexico, the State Department decisively asserted that "since under the
American Constitution liberty of speech and of the press is guaran-
teed, mere propaganda in and of itself would probably not fall within
Nations Security Council regarding the Cuban complaint against the United
States, 43 Dep't State Bull. 199, 202 (1960).
56. This is brought out by Professor Julius Stone as regards hostile propa-
ganda on the part of the government, but it is believed that the same observations
are applicable to any kind of hostile action by private persons. See, Stone, Legal
Controls of International Conflict 319 (1954).
57. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). See
also Moschzisker, Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence, 74 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 109, 270, 367 (1925-26).
58. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
59. Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 Brit.
Yb. Int'l L. 1953, at 178, 190-94 (1954).
60. Cf. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26 (1952).
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these [neutrality] statutes and would not therefore be punishable
thereunder." 61 In another communication, the Department conclu-
sively said:
Regarding the stress which your excellency lays upon the fact
that certain of those whom you designated as filibusters are
engaging in more or less newspaper propaganda in this country,
I have to repeat the statement already made a number of times
to your excellency's predecessor, that the carrying on of a mere
propaganda either by writing or speaking does not constitute an
offense against the law of nations, nor does it constitute an
offense against the local law since freedom of speech and of the
press is, under the Constitution of the United States, absolutely
assured to those dwelling within its jurisdiction. 2
Many other instances could be given where similar observations
have been most emphatically made.6 3 The basic difficulty with this
fundamental policy is reasonably obvious. It reflects a lack of aware-
ness about such values of peace and security which are pressing for
recognition on the world scene, and which States must effectively
promote within their internal jurisdiction. To those concerned with
the peaceful co-existence of nations as a requirement of world order,
such assertions of the State Department can scarcely meet the inter-
national obligations of the United States to afford friendly foreign
governments adequate protection against revolutionary activities and
propaganda.64 This merely suggests the advisability of not inferring
from the practice of domestic legal systems any general rule of
international law permitting States to ignore revolutionary activities
of refugees on purely domestic grounds. Even if in practice this
problem may be real, it should be remembered that the obligations of a
State on the international plane cannot be avoided by invoking
difficulties of internal constitutional order.65 It may thus be submitted
61. Note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Ambassador, Dec. 1, 1910,
2 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 17, at 141.
62. Note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Ambassador, June 7, 1911,
Id. at 142.
63. Id. at 140-43.
64. Dickinson, Defamation of Foreign Governments, 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 840
(1928).
65. In this connection, the Permanent Court of International Justice said:
"While on the one hand, according to generally accepted principles, a State can-
not rely, as against another State, on the provisions of the latter's constitution,
but only on international law and international obligations duly accepted, on the
other and conversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under interna-
tional law or treaties in force." Advisory Opinion on Treatment of Polish Na-
tionals in Danzig, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 44, at 24 (1932). See also, McDougal,
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that the American practice is at variance with the requirements of
international law. This suggestion is even more compelling when
considering that the federal government has sufficient constitutional
power to enact legislation on the subject, for the Constitution gives
Congress the power "To define and punish... Offenses against the
Law of Nations."6 That revolutionary activities against a foreign
government is an offense against the law of nations can hardly be
denied, for it is indissolubly linked with the peace and security of
mankind 7 The fulfillment of obligations of this kind on the internal
level can be strikingly illustrated by a Congressional Act enacted on
May 16, 1884, preventing and punishing the counterfeiting within the
United States of notes, bonds and other securities of foreign govern-
ments.68 This Act was upheld in United States v. Arjona,60 where the
Court gave expression to the international obligations of the United
States in the following terms:
The law of nations requires every national government to use
"due diligence" to prevent a wrong being done within its own
dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to the
people thereof; and because of this the obligation of one nation
to punish those who within its own jurisdiction, counterfeit the
money of another nation has long been recognized.70
It is exceedingly difficult to see why similar considerations do not
control situations involving revolutionary activities against foreign
governments. It may of course be argued that the most difficult consti-
tutional objection as to the control of speech and association still has
to be answered. In an attempt to meet this objection, it should be
recalled that federal and state statutes have imposed criminal liability
for seditious utterances and publications injurious to public morals
and such statutes have been upheld by the courts against attacks
grounded upon freedom of speech and of the press.7 1 It is to be noted,
The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Per-
spective, 4 S.D.L. Rev. 25, 47-49, (1959).
66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
67. Article 2, paragraphs (5) and (6) of the Draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the United Nations International
Law Commission in 1951, not only prohibit the fomenting of civil strife Nvithin
the territory of a State but also the undertaking or encouragement of terrorist
activities in another State. For text, see Report of the International Law Com-
mission Covering the Work of Its Third Session, 16 May-27 July, 1951. U.N.
Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 18 (A/1858) (1951).
68. 23 Stat. 22 (1884), 18 U.S.C. § 478 (1958).
69. 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
70. Id. at 484.
71. In this connection, see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),
affirming a conviction under the Federal Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917), for
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however, that the operation of this type of legislation is carefully
circumscribed, for the Supreme Court of the United States has
explicitly required that it meet two conditions. These conditions are,
that the crime be properly defined so as to come well within the
exceptions to freedom of speech and of the press,7 2 and that the utter-
ances thus punished constitute a "clear and present danger" that
they will bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
might prevent.7 3 The "clear and present danger" rule is by far the
most important limitation, from the constitutional standpoint, upon
freedom of speech and of the press. It essentially means that before
an utterance can be penalized by the government it must ordinarily
have occurred "in such circumstances" or have been of "such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger" that it would bring about
"substantive evils" within the power of the government to prevent.74
It is therefore submitted that legislation penalizing revolutionary
activities on the part of refugees could be applied within the same
limits.7 5 Ample support for this conclusion can be found in the
recommendations of the President's Committee on Civil Rights of
1947 which, in dealing with legislation punishing subversive propa-
ganda, reached the conclusion that freedom of speech and of the press
would not be infringed if the "clear and present danger" rule were
applied along with a clear standard of guilt and adequacy in the
procedure.76 The benefits to be derived from this approach would go
a long way towards implanting the rule of law in the world com-
munity. 77 This has become an imperative of international life, for
causing or attempting to cause insubordination in the military forces of the
United States by sending to men who had been newly drafted into the army
pamphlets denouncing conscription and urging them to assert their rights in
opposition to the draft. See also, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
affirming a number of convictions for violation of Section 2 of the Smith Act,
54 Stat. 671 (1940), for advocating, advising and teaching the desirability of
overthrowing the government by force; and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925), dealing with a similar sedition law of New York.
72. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); and Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
73. Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
74. Ibid.
75. It should be mentioned that in enacting the Communist Control Act of
1954, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C.A. 841, Congress concluded that the existence of the
Communist Party presents "a clear present and continuing danger to the security
of the United States," and that it "should be outlawed." For text, see Barrett,
Bruton & Honnold, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 1014 (1959).
76. As cited by Wright, The Crime of "War-Mongering," 42 Am. J. Int'l L.
128, 132 (1948).
77. For a comprehensive discussion of contributions that the United States
could make to world order, see McClure, World Legal Order: Possible Contribu-
tions by the People of the United States (1960).
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today over a hundred States of diverse political systems have come
to play a vital role in world community processes."" Certainly, the
peaceful co-existence of these States in the world community would
seem to suggest that their governments be secured against revolution-
ary activities and hostile propaganda originating in other jurisdic-
tions.
IV. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN
CASES DEALING WITH SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF REFUGEES
The arguments adduced in the preceding pages must now be
examined in reference to certain specific cases where the United
States Government has been charged before the United Nations with
helping refugees to overthrow their native government. The most
important of these cases was perhaps the complaint raised by the
Iron Curtain Countries before the General Assembly of the United
Nations on account of Section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act
enacted by Congress in 1951.79 Section 101 (a) of the Act appro-
priates up to $100,000,000:
for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the
Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bul-
garia, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist
dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and
Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union
either to form such persons into elements of the military forces
supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other
purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that
such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North
Atlantic Area and to the security of the United States.8 0
In asking the United Nations General Assembly to condemn this
provision, the Soviet representative to the Political Committee
strongly maintained that this legislation was "an aggressive act...
[and] intervention in the internal affairs of other Members of the
United Nations which was incompatible with the United Nations
Charter and with international law."' 1  Following closely Soviet
78. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind ch. 2, at 62 (1958).
79. For text, see 65 Stat. 373 (1951).
80. This provision has been considered of a highly questionable legal character.
See, Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 46-47 (1958). Also, Dr. Charles
G. Fenwick maintains that this Act is violative of Article 2, paragraph (5) of
the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in that it
undertakes and encourages activities calculated to foment civil strife in another
State. See Fenwick, Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 98, 99 (1952).
81. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 6th Sess., 1st Comm. 103 (A/C.1/SR. 472) (1951).
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reasoning, the Polish representative made a special reference to the
London Convention of 1933 which included, inter alia, the support of
armed bands invading the territory of another State in the definition
of aggression. 12 Wholly apart from the fact that the majority of the
delegates regarded this complaint as groundless and emotionally
charged, as seen by the unconditional rejection of the Soviet resolu-
tion condemning the Act, the significant observation must be made
that the American representative nowhere questioned the statement
of the law as given by the complaining nations, but, rather, vigorously
dissented from the interpretation attached by those nations to the
Mutual Security Act.83 Thus, while the American representative in
principle agreed that support of refugees to rebel against their
government is an international delinquency, he pointedly brought
out that the intention and purpose of the Mutual Security Act was
"to assist refugees from political persecution to take part in the
defense of the North Atlantic Community, if they elected to do so. ' 84
As no one at this time questioned the legality of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization,85 the Mutual Security Act was further supported
by a number of delegates on the basis of the United Nations Charter,
which among the purposes of the United Nations mentions the taking
of "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace.... ,,.86 Certainly, the position adopted by
the United States would seem to fall squarely within this provision.87
For present purposes it may perhaps require emphasis that in
answering the Soviet complaint the United States Government did
not challenge the principle that support of revolutionary activities of
refugees by the State of refuge is an act of aggression. This principle
had been previously invoked by the American representative to the
General Assembly in the earlier case of Greece against Albania,
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in which the Greek Government maintained
82. Id. 1st Comm. 107 (A/C.1/SR.473) (1951).
83. Id. 1st Comm. 103 (A/C.1/SR.472) 1951).
84. Id. at 104. (Emphasis added.)
85. In fact, the Peruvian representative seemed to have linked the legality of
the Mutual Security Act with the legality of the North Atlantic Treaty. See his
remarks, Id. 1st Comm. 119 (A/C.1/SR.475) (1951).
86. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
87. The American representative invoked this provision. See, U.N. Gen. Ass.
Off. Rec. 6th Sess., 1st Comm. 103 (A/C.1/SR.472) (1951). The French repre-
sentative likewise said that the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty "had joined
together to maintain peace and international security in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Charter of the United Nations, it followed therefore that the aim
of the amendment to Act 165 was also in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations... ." Id. 1st Comm. 113 (A/C.1/SR.474) (1951).
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that its northern neighbors were aiding Greek refugees to overthrow
their government.88 Echoing the sentiments of the majority of the
members of the Political Committee, he sharply declared that "...
Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had violated the principle of
international law according to which a State should not assist bands
which were in rebellion against the legal Government of their coun-
try."8 9 This American position is even more striking for another
reason, namely, that it regards the general principle concerning the
duty of a State to protect other States from injurious acts originating
within its jurisdiction, which is historically traceable to the Alabama
Claims, as being susceptible of wider application. On this view, the
traditional distinction between organized hostile expeditions, which
are condemned by international law, and revolutionary acts of indi-
viduals, which are not, seen in the discussion of American law, has no
defensible basis, for in either case the obligation of prevention be-
comes operative. 91 There is much in contemporary international life
that makes that traditional distinction somewhat obsolete.
The problem has become of the most urgent importance under
present conditions when thousands of Cuban refugees, fleeing from
the alleged persecution of their government, have been given asylum
in the United States. The knowledge is common that these refugees
are engaged within the United States in revolutionary activities
directed at the overthrow of the Cuban regime.2 The matter acquired
international concern when the Cuban Government brought this
question to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations
on July 18, 1960,13 substantially maintaining that by tolerating sub-
versive groups within its jurisdiction, the United States Government
was violating its duty of non-intervention, thus presenting a threat
to world peace. Upon American denial, and strong support by other
nations, the Security Council enacted a resolution on July 19, 1960,
noting that the question was under discussion by the Organization of
American States and adjourning consideration of the matter until it
receives a report from that Organization." More recently, when an
88. This case first reached the Security Council on Dec. 3, 1946, and was sub-
sequently transferred to the General Asembly on Sept. 15, 1947. See U.N. Gen.
Ass. Off. Rec. 2d Sess., 1 Comm. 9 (60th meeting) (1947).
89. Id. at 14.
90. United States v. Great Britain (1871). For the record of this arbitration,
see 7 Moore, Digest of International Law, § 1330, 1059-67 (1906).
91. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Subversive Activities and
Hostile Propaganda by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 35 Ind. L.J. 306,
328 (1960).
92. See N.Y. Times, April 12, 1961, p. 14, col. 1.
93. For discussion, see 43 Dep't State Bull. 199 (1960).
94. Id. at 204.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss3/1
CONTROL OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
invasion against the Cuban Government was allegedly launched from
the United States, the Cuban Government again brought a complaint
before the General Assembly on April 17, 1961, charging the United
States with "the international crime of aggression." 95 It is of some
interest to note that the Cuban complaint invoked section 960 of the
United States Code, which prohibits the beginning or setting on foot
of a military or naval expedition within the United States.9 Wholly
apart from the merits of this controversy, the available evidence
strongly indicates that great numbers of Cuban refugees have been
trained in the United States and other areas in Central America with
the apparent purpose of overthrowing the present Cuban regime.9 7
Even the Justice Department of the United States has been vitally
disturbed by these actions, for it apparently believes that these sub-
versive groups are in fact violating the neutrality statutes of the
United States in attempting to prepare and set up a military expedi-
tion against a foreign government.98 This conclusion is powerfully
supported by the fact that a federal district court in Miami indicted
a leader of these groups precisely for having attempted to set up a
military expedition in violation of the law of the United States.99
It is intensely relevant to add that when the Cuban refugees recently
established a provisional government in the United States, the State
Department succinctly warned them that this action "would violate
the United States sovereignty and international law," if done without
the consent of the United States.100
These two cases where the United States has been charged before
the world organization of helping refugees to rebel against their
government are highly instructive from the legal and political stand-
points, for they clearly show how difficult it is for a government to
remain within the framework of its obligations under interna-
tional law where the overthrow of a hostile government would clearly
be to its advantage. It may be seen that in such situations the appli-
cation of the law is permeated with political interests of the highest
order, and this largely accounts for the reason why it exhibits a high
degree of instability.1 1 In the case of the United States, this over-
95. For the statement of the Cuban position, see N.Y. Times, April 18, 1961,
p. 16, col. 1.
96. Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1958).
97. It is similarly true that many Cuban fliers are presently being trained in
Soviet dominated countries. The full story is given in detail in N.Y. Times, April
17, 1961, p. 1, col. 4.
98. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1961, p. 1, col. 5.
99. Ibid.
100. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1961, p. 1, col. 4.
101. Strausz-Hupd & Possony, International Relations-In the Age of Conflict
Between Democracy and Dictatorship 354-55 (2d ed. 1954).
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riding of international law duties is the more dramatic, because of the
apparent American policy to avoid involvement in a situation which
may not only undermine the American position before the inter-
American community, but also supply fresh ammunition to the
propaganda warfare in which nations are presently engaged.
However, to justify legally the American policy of permitting
refugees to engage in revolutionary activities, the attractive thesis
has been advanced that the United States can do so under the rights
of self-defense and reprisals, which are allegedly guaranteed by inter-
national law. 10 2 As these two rights are of a singular contemporary
significance, they deserve a special treatment here.
The right of self-defense, as applied to the matter under considera-
tion, would seem to assume a violation of the rights of the United
States by continuous subversive acts waged both by the Soviet Union
and its satellites, and by the present Cuban Government. As the toler-
ation of these activities by the territorial State is generally regarded
as an international delinquency, 0 3 it can convincingly be argued that
the United States can do the same within its jurisdiction to defend
herself against the possibility of attack or subversion. To put the
matter in different terms, the right of territorial integrity on the part
of the United States gives rise to the right of self-defense against
attack. Implicit in this assertion is the recognition that the right of
territorial sovereignty of the Communist and Cuban Governments is
by no means absolute but must be exercised in manner consistent
with international law. Self-defense by the United States is thus
exercised in an attempt to meet a violation of the United States'
sovereignty proceeding from another jurisdiction. These propositions
seem unquestioned, but they raise critical issues from the standpoint
of the rule of law in the world community, and must therefore be
carefully scrutinized. The starting point in this analysis is the duty
of States to prevent their sovereignty from being used by individuals
to threaten seriously the peace and security of another nation. It has
already been seen that to allow such activities to go unpunished under
the right of territorial sovereignty would certainly amount to an
102. Whitton, Subversive Propaganda Reconsidered, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 120
(1961). See also, Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import
in the Americas 274 (1956). This right of self-defense was also invoked to justify
hydrogen bomb tests. See McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb in Perspec-
tive; Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648 (1955). It should be added
that since the Mutual Security Act was defended on the basis of the North
Atlantic Treaty, and the latter is legally supported on Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter which regulates the exercise of the right of self-defense, then
the Mutual Security Act itself is sustainable on grounds of self-defense. See
supra note 87.
103. 1 Oppenheim, International Law 298 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
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abuse of right for which the menaced community is entitled to re-
dress.,, Thus, since the Communist and present Cuban Governments
are all engaged in activities highly detrimental to the security of the
United States, it follows logically that the right of self-defense on the
part of the United States immediately arises. And the United States
has exercised this right, not by direct intervention, but by tolerating
revolutionary activities against those governments on the part of
their own nationals seeking asylum in the United States. When the
argument is thus posed, the right of the United States to exercise
self-defense appears with breathtaking clarity. The core of the diffi-
culty lies, however, in that resort to measures of self-defense, even
in the limited sense here suggested, is an open invitation to the strong
to be judex in causa sua and, as Professor Julius Stone has well-
observed, it is really incongruous to think of such a measure as being
functionally related to orderly world community processes. 0 5 On the
other hand, the argument is irresistibly suggested that self-defense
is frankly a legal sanction in an international society devoid of a
centralized machinery to enforce the law. 08 Surely, as a proposition
of power politics based on the questionable assumption that self-
defense is a sanction of the law, this suggestion may be quite
acceptable. As a proposition of law, however, it could scarcely find
any justifiable foundation, for self-defense as an enforcement of the
law can only operate in a situation involving a great power vis-a-vis
a minor State.0 7 But on any issue on which two great powers are
opposed, it is certain that each will exercise the liberties which self-
defense allows and, what is even more perplexing, each will identify
its position with the supposed vindication of principles of interna-
tional law. The resulting situation may be war against each other;
but it would certainly be a curious paradox to regard such actions as
emanating from the will of the world community.
The preceding observations merely underlie the important fact
that measures of self-defense are not primarily questions of law but of
the political relations between States,10 8 and therefore, a State policy
104. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 286,
303-04 (1933). See also supra note 19.
105. Stone, op. cit. supra note 56, at 287.
106. Kelsen, Principles of International Law 15-17 (1953).
107. In this context, Professor Edwin D. Dickinson says that "such devices,
theoretically available to all, have actually been a remedy of the strong against
the weak." See Dickinson, Law and Peace 74 (1951). And Professor Josef L.
Kunz, speaking of self-defense, says: "Under such a system a weak State can
hardly go to war or take reprisals against a more powerful State, whereas the
latter may abuse its power." See Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, 54 Am.
J. Int'l L. 324, 325 (1960).
108. Cf. Bowett, op. cit. supra note 80.
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justified on such a theory is highly questionable, to say the least.
This conclusion is defensible on the basis of the United Nations
Charter, for the Charter has imposed substantial restrictions upon
the right of self-defense. Pertinent in this connection is Article 51,
which provides for the exercise of the right of self-defense as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.109
This provision, contradictory as it is, would seem to be clear and
simple in purpose, for it not only safeguards the traditional right of
self-defense but also restricts it. This article narrows the field for
the exercise of self-defense to circumstances involving an armed
attack and only until such a time when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. It should therefore be clear that self-defense is limited both
as to the occasion which gives rise to its exercise and as to its dura-
tion. Though no authoritative definition of an armed attack has ever
been suggested, it is at least generally agreed that an armed attack
is a special type of aggression. 10 The line between armed attack and
other kinds of aggression is in particular cases often difficult to
mark; presumably, however, "armed attack" is narrower than the
term "aggression. ' 11 It probably includes such acts as invasion of a
State by the military forces of another State or some other grave
breach of international peace. On the basis of this analysis, it is
highly questionable that subversive campaigns by the Soviet and
Cuban Governments would make Article 51 of the Charter operative,
unless subversive groups of some dimensions actually invade the
territory of the United States. This analysis of the right of self-
defense further shows the shaky foundation it affords to the Mutual
Security Act and to the toleration of revolutionary activities of Cuban
refugees by the United States Government. This of course does not
minimize the problem confronting the United States security in the
109. U.N. Charter art. 51.
110. Kunz, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 42 Am. J.
Int'l L. 111, 115 (1948).
111. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 244 n. 8 (1954).
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presence of subversive activities originating in Communist dominated
regimes. It does show, however, that the use of self-defense in the
manner suggested is probably no longer admissible under interna-
tional law. 12 The encouragement of revolutionary activities of refu-
gees is really a political tool that has no conceivable legal basis. The
problem is indeed a difficult one that must be solved by the future
formulation of the law. It may be added, however, that the long and
painful exchanges between the West and the Communists in the
Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations
have increased, instead of removing, the perplexities of the problem.
It is still possible to base the United States' policies on the right
to resort to reprisals, as Professor John B. Whitton has strongly
suggested. Professor Whitton recently invoked this thesis as regards
action of the United States calculated to support the aspirations of
the Soviet dominated peoples to rid themselves of the Communist
tyranny.1 1 3 However, a closer study of reprisals under international
law reveals conclusions similar to those reached in respect to the
right of self-defense. The resort to reprisals is a well-known pro-
cedure of international law according to which a nation harmed by
the illegal acts of persons within another country's jurisdiction has
the right to go into the territory of the latter and punish the offend-
ing individuals.1 4 Reprisals thus applied imply the right of the
aggrieved community to punish a State for a violation of an inter-
national obligation. It can readily be seen, therefore, that the resort
to reprisals is nothing more than the application of self-help by the
aggrieved community, and it rests upon the theory that the offending
112. It should be mentioned that the right of self-defense was dealt with in
the recent Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 1, 35, decided by the Inter-
national Court of Justice. Rejecting the United Kingdom's claim that under the
right of self-preservation she had the right to send her Navy into Albanian
territorial waters for the purpose of effecting a mine-sweeping operation, the
Court unmistakably declared that the action of the British Navy constituted a
violation of Albanian sovereignty. The Court said: "The Court can only regard
the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such
as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever
be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international
law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would
take here; for, from the nature of things it would be reserved for the most power-
ful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international
justice." Judge Hersch Lauterpacht believes, however, that this part of the
opinion may be limited to this particular case. See Lauterpacht, The Develop-
ment of International Law by the International Court 317 (1958).
113. Whitton, supra note 102, at 120.
114. Fenwick, International Law 532-33 (3d ed. 1948). For a comprehensive
treatment of reprisals, see Colbert, Retaliation in International Law (1948).
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State has not been able to exert measures of prevention. 11 But
reprisals to rectify wrongs, while permissible by customary interna-
tional law before World War I, have been forbidden by international
instruments of the greatest authority. Particularly applicable are the
League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the
United Nations Charter. For present purposes it is pertinent to
mention that the United Nations Charter obligates the members of
the United Nations "to settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace, and security, and
justice, are not endangered.""ir6 This provision would seem to restrict
substantially the use of reprisals as a means of redress. Restricting
even more the scope of reprisals is the provision which binds the
Members to refrain from the "threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 117 The combined operation of these provisions shows
remarkably well that coercive or punitive measures by a State against
another, even to remedy illegal actions, are no longer permissible
methods of settling international disputes." 8 Professor Whitton,
however, has suggested that reprisals are still sanctions of the law
and that they are limited only by two rules, namely, the rule of neces-
sity and the rule of proportionality. He says in this regard that:
Under the rule of necessity the State undertaking reprisals
must have tried in vain to obtain redress, for instance, protesting
to the other party without result. This rule has been respected
in the present case [the United States case]. Secondly, the
damage inflicted by the reprisals must be reasonably proportional
to the injury suffered by the State applying reprisal.'"
There can be no doubt that these rules were designed to keep re-
prisals within measurable bounds. Despite these limitations, the
inescapable fact still remains that the resort to reprisals cannot be
justified in the light of standards laid down by the United Nations
Charter. Referring to the illegal nature of reprisals, Judge Philip C.
Jessup has aptly said that "An aggrieved state is now under a duty, if
it is a Member of the United Nations, to refer its case to the Security
Council and not to take forceful action on its own behalf."12o Profes-
115. 1 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States 244 n. 21 (2d ed. 1945).
116. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
117. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
118. Professor Julius Stone has reached this conclusion. See Stone, op. cit.
supra note 111, at 289-90.
119. Whitton, supra note 102, at 121.
120. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 175 (1948).
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sor Whitton's valiant effort to treat reprisals in terms of law
completely overlooks that resort to them remains a weapon of the
strong against the weak, and that it is highly incompatible with the
conception of a world community firmly grounded on the rule of
law."12  Just and orderly processes are the essence of the law, and
these objectives are not likely to be attained if conceptions such as
those of self-help, of which reprisal is a type, continue to dominate the
international legal order.
CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this article may give rise to the conten-
tion that it really leaves a government, against which hostile propa-
ganda and subversion are directed, without any legal means of
redress. To counteract such hostile acts by the toleration of revolu-
tionary activities by refugees on the basis of alleged rights of self-
defense and reprisal has been found to be contrary to existing
international law. While this conclusion may not yet be free from
doubt, the body of evidence here gathered would seem to make it
almost certain that support of revolutionary activities on the part of
refugees by the asylum State is tantamount to complicity in the act
and, as such, it constitutes a serious breach of the duty of prevention
which international law has clearly imposed upon States.12 2 Recent
developments conclusively show that the peace and security of man-
kind are vitally at stake in these situations, for other nations take
advantage of the political climate to support the faction more in
accordance with their ideology. Moreover, previous experience in
major wars gives rise to the suggestion that international conflagra-
tions often have their roots in local conflicts between minor States
or in a civil war apparently confined to the territory of one State.123
It is precisely because of the potential danger of revolutionary
activities by refugees that the obligation to prevent them from engag-
ing in such activities must remain as a fundamental principle of law.
It may further be submitted that the violation of this obligation not
only justifies vigorous protests on the part of the aggrieved govern-
121. Professor Percy E. Corbett says in this connection that resort to such
measures actually amounts to a negation of society for "the entity claiming the
right also claims the exclusive power to determine when it comes into play." See
Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 44 (1951).
122. This is what Professor Quincy Wright has termed "subversive interven-
tion." See Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 Am. J. Intl L. 521, 528 (1960).
123. E.g., some writers maintain that World War II actually began in Spain
in 1936. See Palmer & Perkins, International Relations: The World Community
in Transition 553 (1953). See also Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis
of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy 190-91 (1960).
Washington University Open Scholarship
220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ment, but also the application of preventive or enforcement measures
3n the part of the United Nations. To say this is also to recognize
that since coercive measures can only be applied by the United
Nations, unilateral resort to such measures has no longer any admis-
sible legal basis. This conclusion certainly goes a long way towards
both mitigating the anarchical elements now existing in the world
community and helping to implant law and justice as the basis of the
relations between States.
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